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Abstract 
This article examines opposition to the creation and presence of the West India Regiments in 
Britain’s Caribbean colonies from the establishment of these military units in the mid-to-late 
1790s to the formal ending of slavery in the region.  Twelve regiments were originally created 
amid the twin crises associated with Britain’s struggle with Revolutionary France and the 
horrendous losses to disease suffered by British forces in the Caribbean.  Their rank-and-file 
were mainly comprised of men of African descent, most of whom had been bought by the 
British Army from slave traders or, after the abolition of the British slave trade in 1807, 
recruited from among people ‘liberated’ by the Royal Navy.  While there was nothing new in 
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using men of African descent, free and enslaved, in the service of the European empires in the 
Americas, such enrolments had tended to be for fixed or limited periods.  Thus, the 
establishment of the West India Regiments as permanent military units, whose soldiers were 
uniformed, armed, and trained along European lines, was unprecedented – and bitterly opposed 
by West Indian colonists. Indeed, although white West Indians were concerned about the 
protection of the colonies from both external and internal foes, they were highly sceptical about 
whether arming (formerly) enslaved people of African descent would serve to promote their 
security or might, in fact, imperil the system of racial slavery on which they relied. 
 
The tensions arising from the establishment of the West India Regiments have been examined 
by other historians.   However, much of the previous focus has been on the political conflict 
between the British authorities and local colonial legislatures, and on legal challenges to the 
Regiments, especially during the early years of their existence.  In contrast, this article takes a 
wider view of opposition to the Regiments over a longer period up to the formal ending of 
slavery.  In so doing, it examines how the Regiments’ rank-and-file were viewed by white West 
Indians and the deep anxieties this reveals among colonists.  The article also considers the 
efforts made by the Regiments’ proponents and commanders to promulgate more favourable 
images of black soldiers, images that became more prominent by the 1830s.  The more general 
argument is that this struggle around how the West India Regiments’ rank-and-file should be 
viewed was part of a broader ‘war of representation’ over the image of ‘the African’ during the 
age of abolition. 
 
Keywords: Caribbean; age of abolition; slavery; West Indian colonists; ‘war of representation’ 
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‘[A] mere cloak for their proud contempt and antipathy towards the African race’: 
Imagining Britain’s West India Regiments in the Caribbean, 1795-1838 
 
Introduction 
Writing of early nineteenth-century Jamaica, author J. A. Stewart described the public 
revulsion at the spectacle of deserters ‘pinioned and in a miserable plight’ as they were 
conveyed to the local military head-quarters.  What made this a ‘novel and revolting sight’ was 
that these were white deserters being guarded by black soldiers, men from the 2nd West India 
Regiment.1  This unit was originally one of twelve that had been raised by the British between 
1795 and 1798 during the twin military and demographic crises represented by the struggle 
with Revolutionary France and the decimation of newly-arrived European forces by disease.2  
Although not the intention, the Regiments were soon mainly made up of enslaved Africans 
purchased directly from slave traders.  Such a course of action was highly controversial, 
especially in the eyes of white residents in the British West Indies who were opposed to the 
establishment of permanent military units raised in such a way.  While they shared the concern 
of the British military authorities about the protection of the colonies from both external and 
internal foes, they were doubtful about whether arming (formerly) enslaved people of African 
descent would serve to promote security or might, in fact, imperil the system of colonial 
slavery.  Indeed, to understand why Jamaica’s white inhabitants viewed the scene described by 
Stewart as a ‘novel and revolting sight’, it needs to be understood in the context of the stark 
racial divisions that characterised slave society on the island and elsewhere in the British West 
Indies.  As such, it represented one instance of a revolution in the socio-racial order, and the 
Regiments became a significant source of conflict between Caribbean colonists and their 
colonial legislatures on the one hand, and the British military authorities on the other. 
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The tensions arising from the establishment of the West India Regiments have been examined 
by other historians, most notably by Roger Buckley.3  However, much of the previous focus 
has been on the political conflict between the British authorities and local colonial legislatures, 
and on legal challenges to the Regiments, especially during the early years of their existence.  
In contrast, this article takes a wider view of opposition to the Regiments over the longer period 
from their establishment to the formal ending of slavery in the late 1830s.  In so doing, it 
examines how the Regiments’ rank-and-file were viewed by white West Indians and the deep 
anxieties this reveals among colonists.  The article also considers the efforts made by 
proponents and commanders of the West India Regiments to promulgate more favourable 
images of the black soldiers, which came more to the fore by the 1830s.  The larger argument 
is that the discursive struggle over the West India Regiments’ rank-and-file was part of the 
broader ‘war of representation’ over the figure of the African subject during the age of 
abolition.4 
 
The purchase of enslaved Africans to form the bulk of the West India Regiments was part of a 
long history of military slavery across a number of regions.5  In the Caribbean itself, Spain had 
used armed enslaved people in its earliest conquests, while the English, French and other 
European powers employed them from the seventeenth century.  There was great ambivalence 
about this practice among white colonists of the region, however: while evidence showed they 
could be trustworthy and effective, this sat uneasily with hardening racial ideologies in the 
eighteenth century and the economic self-interest of slaveholders.6  Such ambivalence was 
acute during the Seven Years War, when British West Indian colonists were more concerned 
about slave rebellions than French attacks.  Nonetheless, there was a great deal of ad hoc arming 
of enslaved people in response to particular exigencies and local crises, and ‘the greater scale 
of the conflict necessitated a greater involvement of slaves and free blacks’.  This, in turn, set 
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precedents for the arming of slaves during the American Revolutionary War.  Overall, Philip 
Morgan and Andrew O’Shaughnessy note that, 
 
To stress how much of a radical departure arming slaves was from so-called 
civilized practice, how exceptional a measure it was, does not seem fully to 
describe the reality of much of slave life in the New World.  Arming slaves was 
a dangerous expedient, but one resorted to frequently.7 
 
Yet, while the use of men of African descent in the Caribbean, free as well as enslaved, in 
military and pioneering roles was well established by the late eighteenth century, partly due to 
the expansion of slavery and the relative decline of European populations, these enrolments 
tended to be for fixed and limited periods.  Thus, the establishment of the West India Regiments 
as permanent military units from 1795, whose soldiers were uniformed, armed, and trained 
along European lines, represented what Buckley termed an ‘unprecedented step’ in the 
Caribbean – and one that was bitterly opposed by colonists in the region.8 
 
When the West India Regiments were originally established, the British military authorities 
had in mind three routes for raising the troops: purchases from ‘patriotic’ West Indian slave-
owners, volunteers from among free people of African descent and, if necessary, African men 
purchased directly from slave traders.  Yet, amid little cooperation from the colonial 
authorities, this policy could not be implemented because few slave-owners would sell their 
best enslaved workers for the price offered and most free people of colour were unwilling to 
exchange their relative freedom for military service.9  As a result, the only option was to buy 
recruits directly from trans-Atlantic slave traders.  Indeed, Buckley has claimed that ‘the British 
government was itself, perhaps, the largest individual buyer of slaves’ in the late eighteenth 
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and early nineteenth centuries, purchasing more than 13,000 enslaved Africans for the 
Regiments.10  Even after abolition, the government determined that the trans-Atlantic trade 
would continue to serve British imperial interests, this time in the form of Liberated Africans 
seized by the Royal Navy and recruited into the West India Regiments.11  Between 1808 and 
1815, approximately 2,500 men were enlisted from a variety of recruiting sources including 
from among Liberated Africans.  There was a drop in demand following the end of war with 
France, before recruitment picked up again in the 1820s as Britain sought to garrison its West 
African possessions with African soldiers, including Liberated Africans and those raised at 
Sierra Leone.  Maeve Ryan notes that while the exact number of Liberated African enlisted at 
Freetown is not known, ‘it was sufficiently high that a recruiter remarked in 1837 that “the 
whole of our African corps, and a great part of the West India Regiments that serve in the West 
Indies, are supplied from the liberated Africans at Sierra Leone”’.12  There were also efforts to 
recruit formerly enslaved people into the Regiments in the Caribbean itself.13 
 
The original British authorization of the first West Indian Regiments had been spurred on by 
setbacks across the Caribbean theatre during the war with Revolutionary France: its forces 
suffered in St Domingue, were forced out at Guadeloupe in December 1794 and abandoned St 
Lucia in July 1795, and faced serious revolts in Grenada and St Vincent in 1795, as well as the 
Trelawny Town Maroons uprising in Jamaica.  Together these ‘constituted one of the most 
serious imperial crises ever’ and occurred at a time when British forces were being killed and 
incapacitated by disease.14  Yet, although there were compelling reasons to employ soldiers of 
African descent in the Caribbean, it raised ‘fundamental problems for the plantation system’.15  
For instance, it was a dangerous acknowledgement of the shortage of white manpower.  Nor 
did it sit easily with white racist stereotypes of people of African descent as either 
dishonourable cowards, and thus incapable of serving as soldiers, or as savage brutes and, 
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therefore, uncontrollable and dangerous.  The existence of these soldiers might even serve to 
contest such stereotypes, thus undermining the racial myths that justified slavery.  Hence, while 
the employment of the West India Regiments may have satisfied a British military need in the 
Caribbean, it was at odds with the dominant values characterising white colonial culture across 
the region.16 
 
The arming of enslaved or formerly enslaved people in societies in which slavery was the 
central or dominant system of labour has attracted interest from scholars, often because of the 
apparent ‘paradox’ or ‘oxymoron’ it represents.17  The classic work on the West India 
Regiments is Roger Buckley’s Slaves in Red Coats, which addressed the origins, early service 
and disbandment of the majority of the units.  This account was motivated by Buckley’s view 
that British military historians had been largely uninterested in the Caribbean, while non-
military historians and social scientists working on the region had tended to overlook the 
military dimensions of its history, focusing instead on the economic and social features of the 
plantation system.  Buckley sought to demonstrate that the West India Regiments played a 
significant role in maintaining the British Empire in the Caribbean.  As such, his work played 
something of a recuperative role regarding these units, sharing some continuity with earlier 
regimental histories, as well as anticipating more recent works on the contribution of Caribbean 
soldiers to Britain’s twentieth-century global war efforts.18 
 
Although published over thirty-five years ago, Slaves in Red Coats remains foundational for 
the study of the Regiments.  Nonetheless, there are limitations to Buckley’s account, many 
stemming from his chronological focus.  First, Buckley was concerned with the period from 
1795 to 1815.  While the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars – and their immediate 
aftermath – saw the creation, expansion and disbandment of most of the Regiments, the 1st and 
 8 
2nd West India Regiments endured, the 3rd was only disbanded in 1825 and reformed in 1840, 
and the 4th and 5th Regiments were briefly reformed in the 1860s.  Put simply, the history of 
the Regiments extends well beyond the period under Buckley’s consideration.  Significantly, 
the late-slavery rebellions across the British West Indies (Barbados, 1816; Demerara, 1823; 
Jamaica, 1831-32), as well as the policies and processes associated with amelioration, 
emancipation and apprenticeship, fall outside his consideration.  Second, while Buckley 
attended to opposition to the raising of the West India Regiments, his focus was primarily on 
legislative politics and legal challenges, especially in Jamaica.19  Yet, Jamaica was an unusual 
case: its white elite successfully resisted the presence of West India troops until May 1801 and 
the troops were almost entirely withdrawn in 1819.  In the late 1820s, only a single company 
of the 2nd West India Regiment was present in Jamaica, confined to Kingston.20  The pattern 
across the Windward and Leeward Islands, the Bahamas and Honduras was different.  The 
third and perhaps most significant feature of Buckley’s work, and one which influences much 
of his argument, is his overwhelmingly positive opinion of the West India Regiments and their 
contribution to the British Caribbean colonies.   He sought to demonstrate the loyalty and 
military capabilities of the soldiers, thus giving lie to the racist prejudices of white West Indian 
residents and the subsequent lack of regard from British military historians.  Indeed, Buckley 
had no doubt that the complete ‘Africanisation’ of Britain’s rank-and-file in the Caribbean 
would have made perfect sense for ‘incontrovertible reasons of health, humanitarian 
considerations, economy, and military efficiency’.21 At the same time, and partly by virtue of 
his chronological focus, he had relatively little to say about the policing function of the West 
India Regiments and their role in maintaining African and African-creole men, women and 
children in slavery.22 As both victims and oppressors in Caribbean history, these soldiers are 
ambiguous figures who cannot be recuperated – nor less celebrated – in a straightforward way. 
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In the conclusions to Slaves in Red Coats, Buckley noted that ‘more research is needed before 
a clear understanding of the impact of the British garrison on the development of West Indian 
racial attitudes is available’ and he speculated about how their presence may have served to 
undermine white racism.23  However, by focusing primarily on formal political and legal 
opposition to the Regiments and understanding opposition to them as stemming from the 
bigoted ignorance of West Indian colonists and their agents, Buckley underestimated how 
deeply assumptions about the socio-racial order were embedded in everyday white West Indian 
culture.  Brown notes that: 
 
Fears about what the slaves would do if armed may tell more about the anxieties 
and needs of the slaveholding class in the Americas than about the likely 
behaviour of enslaved men.  Such anxieties, perhaps, arose as much from 
prejudice and ideology as from a careful mixture of probable outcomes.24 
 
Such ‘anxieties’, ‘prejudice’ and ‘ideology’ were at the heart of white opposition to the 
establishment and presence of the West India Regiments in the Caribbean.  They were 
manifestations of the intense ‘negrophobia’ that was habitual among white, slaveholding 
minorities in colonial slave societies.  Indeed, the central issue for understanding the 
representation and image of the Regiments is not whether white West Indian assessments of 
the Regiments became less biased as the black soldiers ‘proved’ themselves, but rather to 
appreciate the deep-seated phobias, fantasies and fears that their presence provoked.25  As this 
article will demonstrate, these colonial anxieties could be dramatically called forth by particular 
events and often endured despite the actual actions, achievements or military record of the 
black soldiers. 
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In order to examine the tensions around the West India Regiments beyond their formal political 
and legal manifestations, this article examines public responses to the West India Regiments 
among white colonial populations in the Caribbean during the period of slavery.26  While it 
may have been the more privileged and powerful sections that played a disproportionate role 
in shaping these, or at least had their views recorded, this article is concerned less with the 
‘official’ voice expressed by legislatures and in communications with the governors, and more 
on a broader, more inchoate, public discourse.  While there are no social surveys to determine 
attitudes, reports do exist of public moods and general opinions, as well as accounts of rumours 
and hearsay, that reveal white West Indian fears and fantasies.  In addition to Colonial and War 
Office papers, legislative minutes, local histories and travellers’ accounts, a couple of types of 
sources are particularly useful in this regard.  First, there are the letters, public statements and 
actions of officers commanding the various West India Regiments.  These men were fully 
aware of the opprobrium that their soldiers faced, something they often complained about in 
correspondence with the War Office, where they reported slights and insults, tensions with the 
militia, and the rumours spread by critics.  Second, colonial newspapers give some insight into 
the public image of the West India Regiments.  They carried news of military actions, including 
those in which the Regiments were involved such as the capture of Guadeloupe in 1810, which 
involved some 2500 black troops among the expeditionary force of 6700.  Although the 
Regiments were not singled-out, these reports may have improved white public opinion of 
them.  Yet, despite the awarding of battle honours to the 1st and 4th West India Regiments for 
their actions at Dominica (1805), Martinique (1809) and Guadeloupe (1810), negative accounts 
continued to circulate.  Such reports reflected and fed white anxieties, and commanding officers 
complained that they misrepresented facts and fanned the flames of public hostility.27  
Moreover, with colonial newspapers carrying regular reports of the arrival and departure of 
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army units, including companies and detachments from the West India Regiments, they served 
as a constant reminder of a presence that was deeply troubling to many West Indian colonists. 
 
General Perceptions 
From the emergence of discussions around establishing the West India Regiments in the 1790s, 
there was legislative opposition across the British West Indian colonies.  Buckley has described 
Governor Balcarres’ clashes with Jamaican planters in 1797 and 1798, but there was a similar 
reaction elsewhere.28  For example, in 1798, the Antiguan Assembly was unanimous in its 
opposition to a plan to quarter the 8th West India Regiment on island because it was ‘composed 
almost entirely of Africans, totally unacquainted with our language and customs, without the 
least Idea of Religion, and in the most barbarous and uncivilised state’.  In a striking turn of 
phrase, the Assembly expressed fears about the effects of the presence of the West India 
Regiments on the enslaved populations, describing the ‘Revolution [that] will take place in 
their minds’ on encountering black soldiers.29  Writing of the resistance to the scheme from the 
Barbados Assembly around the same time, local historian John Poyer noted that, 
 
Notwithstanding this just representation of the evils with which this scheme is 
evidently pregnant, in which all the other colonies concurred, government 
persisted in the dangerous design…And without pretending to the gift of 
prophecy, it may be hazarded, as no improbable conjecture, that, at no distant 
period of time, these faithless blacks, in conjunction with the national foe, or 
colonial traitors, will employ the arms, unwisely put into their hands, in 
murdering their officers; subverting the power of Britain in this hemisphere; 
and erecting the savage despotism of Africa on the ruins of English liberty.30 
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Political opposition reflected wider popular disquiet.  Absentee planter William Young noted 
that ‘[t]here is something in the temper and constitution of these negro regiments which ever 
has been, and not unreasonably, a matter of distrust and jealousy to the colonists’, while in his 
Annals of Jamaica, the Reverend George Bridges wrote of ‘the obnoxious regiment of blacks’ 
whose very presence served to ‘harass the country’.31  As such comments attest, the black 
soldiers of the West India Regiments became a focal point for a series of white (creole) fears – 
fears that they might turn their arms against their officers and white colonists, that they might 
conspire with enslaved rebels or the French, or simply that their presence might inspire ideas 
of equality among enslaved people, and thus provoke a ‘Revolution…in their minds’.32  
 
Such sentiments were strongest amid the revolutionary ferment of the 1790s and early 1800s.  
Indeed, in their attacks on the West India Regiments, colonists portrayed them as potential 
‘brigands’, the term the British used to describe the self-liberating enslaved people and others 
who fought against their Caribbean empire in this period.33  The Haitian Revolution loomed 
large, of course.  The spectre of a mass revolt by enslaved people, occurring not far from the 
chief British colony of Jamaica, would haunt white colonists for a generation.  Moreover, 
Britain’s catastrophic military intervention in St Domingue (1793-98) had not only failed to 
suppress the revolution, but had seen the defeat of British troops by disease and the formerly-
enslaved forces of Toussaint L’Ouverture.34 With revolutionary ideas spreading across the 
region, the deliberate policy of arming enslaved people was seen as a great folly, particularly 
if these troops were sent to serve in revolutionary ‘hot-spots’.  For example, the Jamaica 
Assembly warned that ‘[t]he idea of sending negroes from Jamaica to St. Domingo to return 
with French opinions conveys a horror to their minds’.35  The events in St Domingue also 
served to reinforce notions of the ‘natural’ violence and savagery supposedly exhibited by men 
of African descent, particularly those brought direct from Africa.   As one observer put it, ‘[t]he 
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arming and training so many of these hirelings, after the mournful scenes and horrid barbarities 
of their committing we have witnessed in St. Domingo, is surely not the prudent dictates of 
wisdom’.36  Such sentiments were further reinforced by mutinies among West India Regiment 
soldiers, a theme that will be addressed later. 
 
It is important to stress that it was not that white Caribbean colonists were opposed to the 
arming of enslaved people in all circumstances.  Indeed, opponents of the West India 
Regiments set much store by the use of irregular units against enslaved rebels and foreign 
invaders alike.  So called ‘black-shot’ were soldier-slaves raised in military emergencies.  For 
example, even amid a general uprising of enslaved people, as occurred during Fédon’s 
Rebellion in Grenada (1795-97), slaveholders armed trusted enslaved men and formed them 
into a ranger corps.  Indeed, the military formations that came to comprise the initial cores of 
the 9th, 10th, 11th and 12th West India Regiments were created in just this way.  Held to be bound 
by the ties of paternalism, such black-shot were supposedly loyal to the masters who armed 
and often led them.  Some might subsequently be rewarded with manumission and go on to 
serve in colonial militias, while others were returned to their usual roles when the emergency 
was over.37  With the West India Regiments, however, it was the shift from ad hoc units to 
permanent corps that was deemed objectionable, serving as a constant reminder of the white 
colonists’ reliance on black soldiers and representing a new and potentially disruptive element 
within the socio-racial order of the Caribbean colonies.  There was also the matter of control: 
whereas units of rangers were usually led by slaveholders-cum-militia officers, the new West 
India Regiments had regular officers in command and their deployment was in the hands of the 
metropolitan War Office.  As a result, they could by ‘foisted’ upon unwilling colonies or sent 
elsewhere after being raised locally.  This issue of control also encompassed whether West 
India Regiment soldiers were subject to local slave laws.38  A further source of white anxiety 
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stemmed from uncertainty over what would happen to the soldiers when they were discharged 
or when units were disbanded, something that also turned on their ambiguous social and legal 
status.39  In short, West Indian colonists fundamentally distrusted these well-armed, trained 
black troops that lay beyond the control of the local slaveholders and feared that they posed an 
existential threat to the slaveholding order.  Such soldiers were nothing more than potential 
‘brigands’. 
 
Even after the initial opposition to their establishment had passed, white West Indians 
continued to express anxieties about the Regiments and pointed to mutinies in the first decade 
of the nineteenth century as proof that such fears were well grounded.40 For the abolitionist and 
government official James Stephen, popular animosity to the West India Regiments was ‘a 
strong illustration of the baneful effects of colonial prejudices’ that persisted despite the 
positive reports made by commanding officers about their actions and the lives of British troops 
that were preserved by their use.  Ultimately, Stephen put this down to the deeply racist culture 
that characterised the West Indian colonies: ‘the jealousy which the white colonists profess of 
such defenders, is in great measure a mere cloak for their proud contempt and antipathy towards 
the African race’.41  Significantly, he went on to compare the public discourse around West 
India Regiment soldiers with that concerning free people of colour.  As has been argued 
elsewhere, the latter were ‘liminal’ figures in Caribbean slave societies that ‘occupied a 
position of “in-betweenness” and ambiguity’.  Dressed in the same basic uniform as the rank-
and-file of the British foot regiments (figure 1) and yet with uncertainty about their legal status 
and doubts about where they loyalties lay, the West India Regiment soldier was another liminal 
figure and like others – free people of colour especially – were a focus for white colonial 
anxieties, apprehensive representations and projects of racial re-inscription intended to put or 
keep them in the ‘right place’.42  Moreover, by implicitly subverting the hierarchies and 
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systems of authority that characterised Caribbean slave societies, black soldiers occupied a 
status similar to other figures seen as potential agitators by white colonists: missionaries and 
abolitionists.43 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE] 
 
In response to such colonial anxieties, the British authorities made efforts to assuage public 
concerns.  For example, regiments, companies and detachments were regularly redeployed in 
response to white fears that they would form local attachments with enslaved people that might 
militate against their loyalty to the authorities.44  Black troops were also confined to garrisons 
removed from major settlements, such as Fort Augusta in Jamaica, Monk’s Hill (Great George 
Fort) in Antigua, Prince Rupert’s Bay in Dominica and St Joseph’s barracks, Trinidad.45  
Finally, the proportion of black to white troops in each colony was monitored, such that soldiers 
of African descent were to be limited to a third of the total.46  As to whether such measures 
worked and West Indian colonists became more comfortable with the presence of the 
Regiments, Buckley suggests that ‘there was a noticeable waning of colonial efforts to rid the 
British Caribbean of black regiments’ by the early 1800s.47 However, writing of this period, 
Brigadier General Thomas Hislop – an acute observer of the Regiments and their social 
position who raised the 11th, served in the 8th and later became lieutenant-governor of Trinidad 
– claimed that they actually faced greater public hostility in the early nineteenth century.  This 
was because once the immediate threat to the West Indian colonies had passed following the 
arrival in the region of the Abercromby expedition in 1796 and the British withdrawal from St 
Domingue, white colonists saw less need for the Regiments to defend them: 
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Their utility was then universally acknowledged, and it is not improbable but 
that many persons, whose principal reliance was then on the exertions of the 
Black Troops, have since, (the danger being passed) been among the most 
strenuous in representing them as dangerous to ourselves, and contemptible in 
the eyes of an Enemy.48 
 
Moreover, mutinies among the Regiments in 1802 and 1808 certainly provoked negative 
sentiments (see below).  While Buckley was right that formal opposition to the Regiments, 
including legal challenges, may have declined, there is not much evidence for a broader shift 
in white public opinion.  Writing of the period from the end of the wars with France to 
emancipation, Brian Dyde also suggests that the image of the Regiments among white colonists 
may have been improved by the counter-insurgency role they played during the slave 
insurrections of 1816 and 1823.49  Yet, as will be discussed below, there is little particular 
evidence for this either. 
 
It might have been thought that following the cessation of conflict with France in 1815 and the 
reduction in the number of West India Regiments, which were reduced from eight to three by 
1819, they would slip from public concern.  However, the number of white troops in the region 
was also reduced.  By 1819, there were 2291 West India Regiment soldiers, less than half the 
number of 1810.  However, the number of other regular troops had declined even more rapidly, 
from 15,478 to only 5316 by the same year.  Although, the target ratio of two-to-one would 
appear to have been maintained, any West Indian with knowledge of the state of the imperial 
armed forces, perhaps gleaned through socialising with officers, would realise that such figures 
hid much higher rates of incapacity among white soldiers.  For example, in 1819, more than 1 
in 10 of the non-West India Regiment soldiers were deemed sick (as compared with less than 
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1 in 30 for the West India Regiments), making the overall ratio of white to black soldiers that 
were fit for duty just over two-to-one.  Separating out the northern Jamaica Command, which 
included Honduras and the Bahamas, from the southern Windward and Leeward Islands 
Command, however, reveals variations, with fewer than two white soldiers per black soldier 
across the latter.  Moreover, at some stations – Trinidad, St Lucia, Antigua, St Kitts and 
Montserrat – soldiers from the West India Regiments or the Royal West India Rangers, which 
was a convict unit made up of men of African descent, made up the majority of the garrison 
and almost two-fifths of that at the Command’s headquarters in Barbados.50  Overall, the 
British Caribbean colonies actually became more reliant on black soldiers after 1815 and they 
remained a troubling presence for white West Indians. 
 
Triggering Anxiety 
While there was an underlying animosity towards the presence of the West India Regiments in 
the British West Indies throughout the period of slavery, certain occurrences intensified public 
hostility.  Most significant were uprisings among the troops, ‘mutinies’ as they were rather 
over-dramatically termed given their scale.  In the first half-century after the establishment of 
the Regiments, there were three such events involving men from the 8th in Dominica in April 
1802 (the so-called ‘Black Man’ mutiny), the 2nd in Jamaica in May 1808, and the 1st in 
Trinidad in June 1837.51  While relatively minor events from a military perspective and 
supressed within a matter of days, their wider social and political significance should not be 
underestimated.  In the post-mutiny fall-out, when courts-martial and courts of enquiry were 
convened, there was a public clamour to understand their origins and apportion blame.  
Following the 1808 mutiny in Jamaica, for example, there was an extended dispute between 
the commanding officer and the Assembly, which wanted to conduct its own investigation.   
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This led to a major breakdown in relations between the military and civilian authorities that 
imperilled colonial support for the British army’s presence in the colony.52 
 
The early nineteenth-century mutinies were read as evidence of the general character of black 
soldiers.  Of the 1802 ‘Black Man’ mutiny, for example, it was asserted that ‘[t]he late ferocity 
of one of the Negro Corps in Dominica where they murdered their officers…is a striking 
presage of their future conduct’.53  Indeed, commanding officers appear to have been at least 
as concerned about the reputational damage caused by the mutinies as by the events themselves.  
As General William A. Villettes wrote of the Jamaica mutiny: 
 
I have no doubt your Lordships will readily conceive the general alarm which 
this unfortunate event created throughout the Island, and the increase of 
prejudice and rancour which it has occasioned against this corps, particularly 
amongst those, who at this moment are glad to have every opportunity of 
opposing the views, and embarrassing the measures of His Majesty’s 
Government.54 
 
In such a context, rumours spread rapidly about unrest and further plots among the troops.  For 
instance, a few days later, a white creole wife of an officer of the Royal Artillery heard from a 
gunner that another mutiny was about to take place among a detachment of the 2nd West India 
Regiment stationed at Port Royal.  Local militia forces were mustered and proceeded to march 
on garrison without seeking to verify the story or make contact with the garrison’s commanding 
officer.  On arrival, the garrison was found to be in a state of calm and no evidence of a plot 
was discovered.55  James Stephen would later claim that the colonial authorities and their agents 
made co-ordinated efforts to spread ‘false grounds of alarm…until they succeeded in getting a 
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large part of the black corps disbanded’.56  Whether this and other such alarms were ‘real or 
pretended’ is perhaps beside the point. Either way, they speak to the colonial anxieties 
generated by the presence of West India Regiment soldiers.57 
 
The consequences of mutinies for the general discourse on the West India Regiments went 
beyond the immediate society in which they occurred.  The authorities were faced with the 
question of what to do with mutinous Regiments, once the ring-leaders had been executed and 
others involved had been sentenced to transportation or other punishment.  With local calls for 
their removal, units had to be sent elsewhere – a decision greeted with horror in the colonies 
that might be their destination.  For example, after the 1802 Dominica mutiny, the 8th was 
initially withdrawn to Martinique, but its long-term future was in question because ‘the most 
uneasy sensations will naturally be excited’ wherever it might subsequently be stationed.  In 
the end, the Regiment was sent on to Barbados, where there was a large British force to watch 
over it, and then reduced (i.e. broken up).58  Likewise, following the 1808 mutiny, the 2nd was 
initially sent from Jamaica to assist with driving French forces from Santo Domingo and later 
relocated to the Bahamas.59 
 
Second only to mutinies in generating disquiet around the West India Regiments were events 
that might have been thought to increase white confidence in them: rebellions and revolts 
among the enslaved populations.  There were three of these in the British West Indies in the 
early nineteenth century.  During the 1816 rebellion in Barbados, 150 men of the 1st West India 
Regiment, commanded by Major Cassidy, clashed with approximately 400 enslaved rebels at 
Bayley’s plantation in the parish of St Philip.  This was the climax of the rebellion when the 
rebel leaders may have been killed.60  Seven years later, a detachment of the same Regiment 
was present during the insurrection in Demerara.  The militia was called out to patrol 
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Georgetown, ‘while the 1st West India Regiment and a detachment of the 21st Regiment, all 
under Captain Stewart of the former Regiment, marched up the coast towards the seat of the 
trouble at Mahaica’.  Two further companies of 1st West India Regiment also arrived from 
Barbados on 26 September but were ‘hardly required’.  Subsequently, small detachments of 
West India Regiment soldiers were posted across the colony in an effort to maintain order.61 
 
As has already been noted, Dyde suggests that the counter-insurgency role played by the West 
India Regiments in these insurrections could have helped to improve how they were viewed by 
white colonists.62  While this may have been the case in the long-term, the immediate responses 
were characterised by suspicion and anxiety, despite the fact that in both Barbados and 
Demerara, it was West India Regiment soldiers who were ‘put in advance, and by whose fire 
the insurgents were dispersed’.63  For example, following the circulation of correspondence 
unfavourable to the conduct of the Regiments’ soldiers during the 1816 Barbados revolt, the 
colonial governor was quick to state that ‘any misconduct imputed to the Corps in question, or 
indeed to any of the Black Troops within this command, must have arisen from 
misrepresentations’.64  There was no evidence of any misconduct among the black soldiers and 
yet the circulation of negative reports, presumably by white slaveholders to their metropolitan 
contacts, demonstrates continuing efforts to discredit the Regiments.  West India Regiment 
soldiers also helped to end the Demerara slave rebellion and yet local colonists were soon 
‘anxiously looking forward’ to arrival of new reinforcements and ‘most desirous to have the 
black troops removed from the outposts where they were stationed on the coast’.  White 
colonists were fearful were that small, dispersed groups of West India Regiment soldiers would 
be drawn into ‘habits of too much intimacy with the male slaves and of connection with the 
female’.  As a first step, they urged that all three companies of black troops should be brought 
together in a single body in Georgetown.  In fact, the imperial authorities had already begun to 
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make such plans.  The company of the 1st West India Regiment that had been involved in the 
counter-insurgency in Demerara was withdrawn along with those two companies newly-
arrived from Barbados, and no black soldiers would be present in the colonies that would come 
to form British Guiana until the late 1830s.65  There are clear similarities between post-mutiny 
and post-rebellion redeployments and both speak to the same hostility and fear among white 
West Indians. 
 
While it was unsurprising that major events such as mutinies and rebellions provoked strong 
reactions towards the West India Regiments, even seemingly minor events could also trigger 
outbreaks of colonial anxiety.  Reports of fracas and petty infringements of duty attracted 
attention in the colonial press.  For example, while ‘originating in a mere trivial dispute’, an 
affray between men from the 1st West India Regiment and the Royal West India Rangers at St 
Ann’s Garrison in Barbados, garnered press attention and was seen as revealing the general 
nature of black soldiers: 
 
we cannot withhold the observation which so naturally arises on connecting this 
event with others of a similar nature which have recently occurred in some of 
the other Garrisons in this Command – that His Majesty’s service is never likely 
either to be honoured or benefited by the introduction of this turbulent and 
untractable class of men into the ranks of his Army.66 
 
Likewise, alterations in how individual companies or detachments were deployed in particular 
colonies could spark conflict between the military and local civilian authorities.  For instance, 
since arriving in Jamaica in 1801, the soldiers of the 2nd West India Regiment had been 
confined to Fort Augusta, while the companies of the British-raised regiments were deployed 
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across the island.  As has been mentioned, the confinement of black troops in isolated sites was 
part of the ‘modus vivendi eventually worked out between the colonial party and London’.67  
Yet, this often left West India Regiment soldiers with little to do, while white soldiers were 
required to perform arduous duties seen to be detrimental to their health, such as repairing roads 
or fortifications.  In late 1807, efforts were made to end this sub-optimal military deployment 
and the sop to local sensitivities that it represented with detachments of the 2nd at Fort Augusta 
exchanged with white troops at Up-Park Camp, and other West India Regiment detachments 
distributed elsewhere across Jamaica.  As a result, by the end of 1808, there were large bodies 
of black soldiers at Up-Park Camp, Port Royal and Fort Augusta, plus smaller numbers 
elsewhere at Greenwich, Port Henderson, Kingston, Greys Penn, Government Penn and 
Carleton Penn.68  This redeployment was strongly opposed by white Jamaicans, however, who 
petitioned the governor for all black troops to be returned to Fort Augusta.69  Following the 
May 1808 mutiny and the discovery of an enslaved conspiracy in Kingston the year later, such 
concerns are perhaps unsurprising.70  What they also indicate is the strength of the colonial 
anxieties surrounding the Regiments.  It was not merely their (imagined) conduct that shaped 
how they were perceived, but their very presence that served to unsettle white colonists in the 
early nineteenth century. 
 
Promoting the Troops 
Strong local animosity towards the West India Regiments represented a major challenge for 
their supporters and especially for those who commanded them.  In response, they fought hard 
to promote a more positive image of the Regiments, making deliberate public interventions to 
demonstrate the fidelity and steadfastness of their men, something that could earn them great 
personal unpopularity among white colonists.  The issuing of General Orders to the troops, 
which were also printed in local Royal Gazettes and other newspapers, also served as a means 
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of communicating with the public beyond the garrison.  As such, they were used to respond to, 
or pre-empt, criticisms of the West India Regiments.71  Moreover, commanders sent a message 
about their confidence in their men by using them in high-profile roles, such as guarding their 
personal residences or those of colonial officials.72  Such actions arose partly from the loyalty 
of commanders to their men, but these also served to contest local attitudes and opinions.  In 
addition, they reflected concerns about the effects of public hostility on the troops themselves.  
For example, writing of his own black soldiers in Jamaica, Major-General Hugh Carmichael 
stated that ‘nothing in my opinion is so likely to rouse their discontent at present, as the 
inveterate prejudice which so universally prevails against them in this island, and the apparent 
distrust of them which it must necessarily occasion’.73  Hence, commanders sought to counter 
the potentially baneful effects of attacks on and criticism of the Regiments on the black soldiers 
themselves. 
 
It was particularly vital in the aftermath of mutinies for the image of West India Regiment 
soldiers to be defended.  For example, after the 1808 mutiny in Jamaica, General Villettes was 
at pains to stress the ‘loyal and proper feelings and spirit shown by the body of the [2nd] 
Regiment’ who attacked the mutineers and helped to put it down.74  Similarly, his successor in 
command, Major-General Hugh Carmichael, emphasised that the mutiny had involved only 33 
recruits out of a regiment with an effective strength of nearly one thousand and he publicly 
commended the vast majority of soldiers who had tried to defend their officers.  While it was 
not practicable to reward them all, Carmichael singled out a handful of men, mainly those who 
had been wounded, for medals and monetary rewards to mark their ‘faithful Service’.  Overall, 
Carmichael claimed that such actions furnished ‘a most convincing proof that the honourable 
mind of a Soldier of whatever Country and Colour he may be when once formed and instructed 
can never be transformed to that of a Traitor or cowardly Assassin’ and thus sought to portray 
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the majority of his men as reliable soldiers rather than would-be mutineers or potential 
‘brigands’.  Carmichael was a staunch supporter of his men: based on eleven years’ experience, 
he asserted that he had the ‘utmost confidence in their loyalty and good conduct on any 
Service’.  His very public stance led him to clash with the Jamaican Assembly and he was 
eventually reposted elsewhere in the region.75  Again, such events demonstrate the intensity of 
the struggle over the image of the West India Regiment soldier. 
 
Taken together, the West India Regiments’ commanding officers sought to represent their rank-
and-file as ‘the most orderly, clean and attentive soldiers’ – or as a later writer would put it: 
‘[h]e is docile, patient, brave, and faithful’.76  That supporters achieved some success in shifting 
the public discourse around the Regiments’ soldiers – as well as their increasing acceptance in 
the Caribbean colonies – can be seen in the appearance of more positive accounts of them in 
the colonial press in the 1830s.  Extracts from regimental records were reprinted that described 
the establishment of the units and their service against Napoleonic France across the region in 
the first decade of the nineteenth century, actions that had led to the awarding of military 
honours.77  Further evidence for a shift lies in the public response to the third and final mutiny 
of West India Regiment troops in the Caribbean, which occurred among the 1st in Trinidad in 
1837.  The reaction in the press was somewhat different from the earlier mutinies.  While being 
described as ‘[o]ne of the most serious alarms to which the Inhabitants…have ever been 
subject’, subsequent depictions focused on the specific perpetrators – especially the African 
leader, Dâaga (also known as Donald Stewart), who was described as ‘just the man whom a 
savage, warlike, and depredatory tribe would select for their chieftain’ – rather than the black 
soldiers in general.78  Indeed, the ‘nearly 300 savages’ involved in the mutiny were contrasted 
with the small numbers of loyal ‘old Soldiers’ present at the time.  Though out-numbered ten-
to-one and deprived of their arms, these ‘civilised’ men remained ‘steady’ and ‘firm to their 
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duty’.79  These ‘old Soldiers’ embodied the more positive image of the West India Regiments 
that their proponents had emphasised, men in whom West Indian colonists could have 
confidence. 
 
Coming fourteen years after the last major regional event involving the Regiments, which was 
their role in helping to put down the 1823 Demerara Revolution, and following the beginning 
of the formal ending of slavery, there seems to have been a shift in the discourse surrounding 
the Regiments: the 1837 mutiny was not seen as symptomatic of the problematic status of black 
soldiers in general but rather as indicating the dangers of the specific practice of drafting of 
‘uncivilised’ Africans into the units in large numbers.  Indeed, although Colonial Office 
officials acknowledged that the affair would be regarded as ‘an argument against Black levies’, 
they were confident that it was actually an ‘argument against them being raised so rapidly and 
disposed of so collectively as to make the number of new savage soldiers at any station…a 
large proportion to the number of old and civilised’.80  As a result, this practice was ended and 
plans were put forward to use Barbados as a staging post for black troops arriving in the 
Caribbean.81 
 
The apparent improvement in white colonial attitudes towards the West India Regiments was 
related to the broader shift in the socio-racial order associated with formal emancipation 
between 1834 and 1838.  In this context, the black soldiers were no longer were ‘liminal’ 
figures in the Caribbean whose very existence undermined the racialized logic of slave 
societies.  Instead, they were a part of the non-white population in a post-slavery society that 
could be relied upon by virtue of the military discipline to which they were subject.  Colonial 
residents came to view the Regiments’ soldiers as a source of social stability and a potential 
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defence against ex-slaves.82  Such hopes were not misplaced and the Regiments played an 
important role in maintaining order across the post-emancipation Caribbean.   
 
Conclusions 
Responses to the West India Regiments in the Caribbean colonies from the late eighteenth to 
early nineteenth centuries have to be understood in relation to the deep anxieties that soldiers 
of African descent engendered in slave societies.  While it is not surprising that mutinies would 
create dismay and dread, this article has also emphasised the importance of the everyday 
presence of the troops, whether because it stoked fears of fraternisation with enslaved people 
or simply arose from the cumulative effects of quotidian encounters.  Relatively minor military 
redeployments also generated strong reactions, pointing to the deep racial phobias that 
characterised white West Indian slaveholding culture.  Likewise, even when the Regiments’ 
rank-and-file helped to suppress enslaved rebels, as they did in 1816 and 1823, unfavourable 
rumours still circulated about them and local colonists were keen for the units to be withdrawn. 
 
There was considerable continuity in the white public discourse around the West India 
Regiments, contrary to the claims made by Buckley and Dyde – at least until the 1830s.  This 
was because they represented a fundamental challenge to the socio-racial order in the British 
West Indies.  Indeed, while Buckley surmised that ‘the constant sight, repeated over many 
years, of blacks expertly leading and commanding whites must have taken some toll of the 
then-current view that blacks were lazy, cowardly, and inferior to whites’ – a reference to the 
fact that some companies contained white privates and black NCOs – the argument made here 
is that this greatly underestimates the irrationalities and paradoxes that characterised cultures 
of West Indian slaveholding.83  After all, many slaveholders seem to have been able to reconcile 
racist negrophobic invective and talk of ‘beasts’ and ‘brutes’ with raising some enslaved people 
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to highly-trusted positions or tasking them with the care of their children.  Observed ‘facts’ did 
not necessarily undermine deep-seated phobias and racist myths.  Thus, no matter how often 
the men of the West India Regiments ‘proved’ themselves, they would continue to be treated 
with mistrust and fear. 
 
This is not to claim that the public discourse could not change.  The response to the 1837 
Trinidad mutiny in the colonial press, as well as the appearance of more positive newspaper 
coverage of the West India Regiments around the same time, suggest the emergence of a more 
quiescent attitude linked to the ending of slavery.  Indeed, the 1837 mutiny seems to presage a 
new discourse in that it was attributed to African ‘savagery’ rather than the ‘paradox’ of armed 
slaves per se.  The cessation of the wholesale importation of raw African recruits into the 
Regiments in the second half of the nineteenth century and their increasing demographic 
creolisation marked a new phase in white colonial responses to them, though amid later related 
developments such as the establishment of local police forces and the reduction of colonial 
militias, as well as post-emancipation unrest – most notably in Jamaica in 1865 – anxieties 
continued to be expressed about the loyalty of West India Regiment soldiers. 
 
Amid all the distrust, alarm and loathing generated by the West India Regiments, their 
proponents – and especially their commanding officers – strove to promulgate a more positive 
image of the units.  To this extent, a ‘war of representation’ was fought over the Regiments – 
akin to that which took place over figure of the enslaved African within the simultaneous 
struggle between pro- and antislavery campaigners from the 1780s to 1830s.84  Indeed, the 
image that commanders promoted was the military equivalent of the ‘good negro’ that was 
central to antislavery efforts to humanise and generate pity for enslaved Africans in this period.  
Most famously visualised in Josiah Wedgwood’s abolitionist medallion of 1787, with its image 
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‘of an African in Chains in a Supplicating Posture’, the ‘good negro’ implored for mercy, 
begged for the chains to be broken and haltingly suggested the circumscribed equality of ‘Am 
I Not a Man and a Brother?’85  There are many similarities between the image of the ‘good 
negro’ associated with the antislavery campaign and that of the West India Regiments’ rank-
and-file promoted by its commanders.  Both sought to contest colonial representations of 
Africans and African-creole people in terms of violent savagery or childlike inadequacy, but 
they did so in ways that maintained them in subservient roles.  As such, both served to produce 
new racist stereotypes.  The struggle over the figure of black soldier is an element of the war 
of representation over Atlantic slavery that has not been considered by historians.  Placing the 
West India Regiments in this wider context expands understanding of the cultural and political 
contests that occurred around different visions of race and racial difference in the British 
Atlantic empire of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, while also helping to 
narrow the gap that still exists between the military and non-military histories of the British 
Caribbean. 
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Figure captions 
Figure 1: ‘A Private of the 5th West India Regiment’ in Charles Hamilton Smith, Costumes of 
the Army of the British Empire, According to the Last Regulations 1812 (Colnaghi and 
Company, 1815).  Courtesy of the Anne S. K. Brown Military Collection, Brown University 
Library. 
 
 
